Enterprise value multiples divide the value of the whole operating business by a measure of what that business produces before any capital provider is paid. The three most common are EV/EBITDA, EV/EBIT and EV/Sales. They are the working language of private equity, M&A and leveraged finance: a buyout is priced as a multiple of EBITDA, debt is sized as a multiple of EBITDA, and a banker's comparable company table is built around all three.
Their appeal is that they compare businesses regardless of how they are financed. Two companies with identical operations and different debt levels have identical EV multiples. That neutrality comes with a cost: each multiple ignores something. EV/EBITDA ignores the capital spending needed to maintain the assets, EV/EBIT depends on depreciation policies, and EV/Sales ignores profitability altogether.
This topic defines the three multiples, shows how differences in depreciation intensity can reverse a ranking between EV/EBITDA and EV/EBIT, explains when EV/Sales is the only option and what it misses, sets out the difference between trailing and forward multiples, deals with the lease accounting change under IFRS 16, and finishes with a full valuation from multiple to share price.
Key takeaways
- EV/EBITDA, EV/EBIT and EV/Sales all use enterprise value, so the metric in the denominator must be before interest and must cover the same business as the EV bridge.
- EV/EBITDA is the default for comparing and pricing businesses, but it flatters capital-intensive companies because it ignores the cost of maintaining their assets.
- EV/EBIT charges depreciation as a proxy for maintenance capital spending and can rank companies differently than EV/EBITDA when D&A intensity differs.
- EV/Sales works for companies without profits, but equals EV/EBITDA times EBITDA margin, so a low EV/Sales can simply reflect a low margin.
- Trailing (LTM) and forward (NTM) multiples of a growing company differ materially; never mix them in one comparison.
- Under IFRS 16, EBITDA excludes lease costs, so lease liabilities must be in EV; EBITDAR and lease-adjusted EV are the way to compare across frameworks.
The three multiples and when to use each
EBITDA is earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization. It is not defined by US GAAP or IFRS; it is built by adding depreciation and amortization, usually taken from the cash flow statement, back to operating income. It is a rough proxy for the cash the operations generate before capital spending, working capital changes and taxes, and it is the metric most loan agreements use to set leverage limits.
EBIT is earnings before interest and taxes, broadly the same as operating income. It deducts depreciation and amortization, so it recognizes that assets wear out and must eventually be replaced. Sales, or revenue, sits at the top of the income statement, before any cost at all.
All three are pre-interest measures, so all three pair with enterprise value. The choice between them depends on how far down the income statement the peers are genuinely comparable, and on whether the company has profits at each level.
- Enterprise value
- Equity value plus debt, preferred, non-controlling interest and debt-like items, less cash and non-operating assets.
- EBITDA
- Operating income plus depreciation and amortization.
- EBIT
- Earnings before interest and taxes, usually operating income.
- Revenue
- Net sales for the same period as the other metrics.
| Multiple | Best suited to | What it ignores | Breaks down when |
|---|---|---|---|
| EV/EBITDA | Most profitable businesses; buyouts and leveraged finance | Capex, working capital, taxes | Capital intensity differs across peers |
| EV/EBIT | Capital-intensive businesses; peers with different D&A levels | Capex above or below D&A, taxes | Acquisition amortization or depreciation policies differ |
| EV/Sales | Unprofitable or early-stage companies; businesses at a cyclical trough | All costs and margins | Peers have different margin structures |
EV/EBITDA: the default, and its blind spot
EV/EBITDA has three practical advantages. It is unaffected by capital structure, because EBITDA is before interest. It is unaffected by differences in depreciation methods and useful lives, and by the amortization of intangibles created in past acquisitions, which can make EBIT and net income hard to compare. And it is positive for many companies whose net income is negative because of heavy depreciation, amortization or interest.
Its blind spot is capital intensity. A telecom network operator and a staffing agency can report the same EBITDA, but the network operator must spend heavily every year to maintain and upgrade its assets, while the staffing agency needs little equipment. EBITDA treats the two as equally productive. Cash available to capital providers is closer to EBITDA less capital expenditure, less the investment in working capital, less cash taxes.
Because of this, many practitioners compute EBITDA less capex as a supplementary measure, and credit investors pay close attention to it. The more capital intensive a peer group is, and the more its capital intensity varies, the less EV/EBITDA alone can be trusted.
- Depreciation
- Allocation of the cost of tangible fixed assets over their useful lives.
- Amortization
- Allocation of the cost of identifiable intangible assets over their useful lives.
- Capital expenditure
- Cash spent on property, plant, equipment and capitalized intangibles in the period.
D&A intensity: when EV/EBIT reverses the ranking
EV/EBIT charges depreciation and amortization against earnings. Depreciation is an accounting allocation of past capital spending, but for a business in a steady state it is a reasonable estimate of the spending needed to maintain the asset base. Deducting it gives a fairer comparison between companies with different capital intensity.
The ratio of D&A to EBITDA is a quick measure of that intensity. Where two companies have similar ratios, EV/EBITDA and EV/EBIT will rank them the same way. Where the ratios differ, the rankings can reverse, and the worked example below shows exactly that.
EV/EBIT has its own distortions. Amortization of intangible assets recognized in acquisitions reduces EBIT for a serial acquirer while an organically grown peer shows no such charge, even though neither needs to spend cash to replace those intangibles. Analysts often use EBITA (EBIT before amortization of acquired intangibles) to remove that effect. Depreciation policies also differ, for example between straight-line and accelerated methods, or in the useful lives chosen.
- D&A intensity
- Share of EBITDA consumed by depreciation and amortization.
- EV/EBITDA
- The EBITDA multiple of the same company.
Selby Services and Tarrant Networks: rankings reverse
- Two hypothetical companies. Figures in $m.
- Selby Services (light assets): EV 1,200; EBITDA 150; D&A 30; capex 35.
- Tarrant Networks (heavy assets): EV 1,100; EBITDA 150; D&A 70; capex 75.
- 1. Selby EV/EBITDA1,200 / 1508.0x
- 2. Tarrant EV/EBITDA1,100 / 1507.3xTarrant looks cheaper.
- 3. Selby EBIT150 - 30120
- 4. Tarrant EBIT150 - 7080
- 5. Selby EV/EBIT1,200 / 12010.0x
- 6. Tarrant EV/EBIT1,100 / 8013.8xUnrounded 13.75x. Tarrant now looks more expensive.
- 7. D&A intensitySelby 30 / 150; Tarrant 70 / 15020.0%; 46.7%
- 8. EV/(EBITDA - capex)Selby 1,200 / (150 - 35); Tarrant 1,100 / (150 - 75)10.4x; 14.7x
Tarrant is cheaper on EV/EBITDA but more expensive on EV/EBIT and on EBITDA less capex, because it must reinvest almost half its EBITDA to sustain its network. For peers with such different capital intensity, EV/EBIT or EV/(EBITDA - capex) is the more reliable comparison.
EV/Sales: valuing companies without profits
When a company has negative EBITDA, EV/EBITDA is not meaningful. Early-stage software, biotechnology and consumer companies investing ahead of growth, and cyclical businesses at the bottom of a downturn, often fall into this category. Revenue is positive for all of them, which is why EV/Sales becomes the fallback.
The blind spot is margin. EV/Sales is identical to EV/EBITDA multiplied by EBITDA margin. A company can therefore look cheap on sales for no better reason than that it keeps less of each dollar of revenue. Comparing a distributor with a software company on EV/Sales is meaningless, and even within one sector, the multiple is only comparable among companies expected to reach similar long-run margins.
For this reason, investors using EV/Sales for loss-making companies usually pair it with a view of the target margin and the path to it, and with operating metrics such as gross margin, revenue growth and, for subscription businesses, net revenue retention. Some use EV/gross profit instead, which captures the difference in gross margins while still working for companies with operating losses.
- EBITDA margin
- EBITDA divided by revenue.
The margin blind spot
- Two hypothetical companies, Company P and Company Q, each with EV $1,200m and EBITDA $150m.
- Company P revenue $600m; Company Q revenue $1,000m.
- 1. EV/EBITDA, both1,200 / 1508.0x
- 2. Company P EBITDA margin150 / 60025.0%
- 3. Company Q EBITDA margin150 / 1,00015.0%
- 4. Company P EV/Sales1,200 / 600 (check: 8.0 x 25.0%)2.0x
- 5. Company Q EV/Sales1,200 / 1,000 (check: 8.0 x 15.0%)1.2x
On EV/Sales, Q appears 40 percent cheaper than P. On EV/EBITDA they are priced identically. The whole of the apparent discount is Q's lower margin.
Quillfield Software: an EV/Sales valuation
- Quillfield Software, a hypothetical loss-making subscription business. NTM revenue $120m; EBITDA negative.
- The analyst selects a range of 3.0x to 5.0x NTM revenue from peers with similar growth and expected long-run margins. This range is an assumption for the example.
- Cash $40m; no debt, preferred or non-controlling interest; 30.0m fully diluted shares.
- 1. Implied EV, low / mid / high3.0 x 120; 4.0 x 120; 5.0 x 120$360m; $480m; $600m
- 2. Add net cash360 + 40; 480 + 40; 600 + 40$400m; $520m; $640m
- 3. Implied share price400 / 30.0; 520 / 30.0; 640 / 30.0$13.33; $17.33; $21.33
Quillfield is worth $13.33 to $21.33 per share on this range. The width of the range, 60 percent from low to high, reflects how little EV/Sales pins down when profitability is still unknown.
LTM versus NTM
Every multiple needs a time period. LTM (last twelve months) figures are the most recent four reported quarters. They are actual results, but for a growing company they understate the earnings that the price is paying for. NTM (next twelve months) figures are forecasts, usually from consensus estimates for listed peers or from management and the analyst's model for a private target.
LTM figures are built from reported filings: take the last full fiscal year, add the year-to-date period of the current year, and subtract the same year-to-date period of the prior year. For a company whose fiscal year ends in December and which has reported nine months of the current year, that combines the annual report with two nine-month interim reports.
For a company growing quickly, the gap between the two multiples can be large. Neither is wrong, but they are different measurements, and a peer table must use one basis throughout. Buyout pricing and leverage covenants usually refer to LTM EBITDA, often adjusted; public equity analysts tend to quote forward multiples. Transaction multiples for past acquisitions are usually available only on an LTM basis.
- Last fiscal year
- The most recent full reported year.
- Current year to date
- The reported interim period of the current year, for example nine months.
- Prior year to date
- The same interim period one year earlier.
LTM and NTM multiples for a growing company
- A hypothetical company. Fiscal year EBITDA $100m. Nine months EBITDA: current year $80m, prior year $70m.
- Forecast NTM EBITDA $132m; enterprise value $1,320m.
- 1. LTM EBITDA100 + 80 - 70$110m
- 2. EV/LTM EBITDA1,320 / 11012.0x
- 3. EV/NTM EBITDA1,320 / 13210.0x
The same company trades at 12.0x trailing and 10.0x forward EBITDA. Putting its 10.0x forward multiple in a table beside a peer's trailing multiple would make it look two turns cheaper for no economic reason.
Leases, IFRS 16 and EBITDAR
Before 2019, most leases were operating leases kept off the balance sheet, and rent was an operating expense deducted before EBITDA. IFRS 16, effective in 2019, requires lessees to recognize almost all leases as a right-of-use asset and a lease liability. The single rent expense is replaced by depreciation of the asset and interest on the liability, both below EBITDA. Reported EBITDA for a company with large leases, such as a retailer, an airline or a restaurant chain, rose sharply on adoption, while its operations were unchanged.
ASC 842 under US GAAP also brought operating leases onto the balance sheet, but it kept a single straight-line lease cost within operating expenses for operating leases. US GAAP EBITDA therefore still deducts operating lease cost. The same retailer reporting under the two frameworks would show different EBITDA and would need different EV bridges to produce a consistent multiple.
The traditional way to compare companies with different lease intensity, or reporting under different frameworks, is EBITDAR: EBITDA before rent. Adding lease costs back puts owners and lessees of property on the same basis. The matching enterprise value must include lease liabilities, so both numerator and denominator treat leases as a form of financing.
- Lease expense
- Operating lease cost or rent that sits above EBITDA; zero for leases already capitalized under IFRS 16.
- Lease liabilities
- Present value of remaining lease payments, as reported under IFRS 16 or ASC 842.
Tamsin Retail: the right and wrong lease multiples
- Tamsin Retail, a hypothetical store chain. Figures in $m.
- Equity value 1,500; net debt excluding leases 300; lease liabilities 500.
- EBITDA after deducting rent of 80 (the pre-IFRS 16 view): 200. EBITDA before rent (EBITDAR, and approximately the IFRS 16 figure): 280.
- 1. EV excluding leases1,500 + 3001,800
- 2. EV including lease liabilities1,800 + 5002,300
- 3. Consistent: EV ex leases / EBITDA after rent1,800 / 2009.0x
- 4. Consistent: EV incl leases / EBITDAR2,300 / 2808.2x
- 5. Wrong: EV ex leases / EBITDAR1,800 / 2806.4xRent removed from the denominator, lease claim missing from the numerator.
- 6. Wrong: EV incl leases / EBITDA after rent2,300 / 20011.5xLease claim counted, but its cost deducted as well.
Both consistent multiples are valid; they differ because they treat leases differently, so a peer table must use one of them for every company. The two mismatched versions range from 6.4x to 11.5x for the same business, a spread large enough to reverse any conclusion.
A worked valuation: from multiple to share price
Harrowgate Components is a hypothetical listed manufacturer. An analyst has built a peer set and concluded that comparable companies trade in a range of 7.0x to 9.0x NTM EBITDA, with a midpoint of 8.0x. The range is an assumption for this example; the topic on comparable company analysis shows how such a range is derived.
The valuation applies the range to Harrowgate's own NTM EBITDA to get implied enterprise value, runs the bridge in reverse to implied equity value, and divides by fully diluted shares. Harrowgate has no options or convertibles, so its share count does not depend on the implied price.
Harrowgate Components: EV/EBITDA valuation
- NTM EBITDA $90m; NTM D&A $25m. Figures in $m except per share.
- Debt $200m; cash $20m; non-controlling interest $20m; no preferred stock, leases already in debt, no associates.
- Fully diluted shares 20.0m (no dilutive securities). Peer range 7.0x to 9.0x NTM EBITDA.
- 1. Implied EV, low / mid / high7.0 x 90; 8.0 x 90; 9.0 x 90$630m; $720m; $810m
- 2. Net debt200 - 20$180m
- 3. Implied equity value630 - 180 - 20; 720 - 180 - 20; 810 - 180 - 20$430m; $520m; $610m
- 4. Implied share price430 / 20.0; 520 / 20.0; 610 / 20.0$21.50; $26.00; $30.50
- 5. Cross-check: implied EV/EBIT at midpoint720 / (90 - 25)11.1xCompare with peer EV/EBIT multiples to test whether the EBITDA range flatters Harrowgate.
Harrowgate is worth $21.50 to $30.50 per share, with $26.00 at the midpoint. Each 1.0x turn of EBITDA multiple moves the share price by $4.50 (90 / 20.0), a reminder that the choice of multiple matters more than any other input.
How lenders use the same multiples
Private credit and leveraged loan investors read EV/EBITDA from the other side of the balance sheet. Total leverage is debt divided by EBITDA, and the gap between the purchase multiple and the leverage multiple is the equity cushion, expressed in turns of EBITDA. A buyout at 10.0x EBITDA with debt of 6.0x leaves 4.0x of equity beneath the lenders, or 40 percent of enterprise value.
Because lenders are repaid from cash, not from EBITDA, they focus on the same blind spots discussed above: capital spending, working capital and taxes. Fixed charge coverage ratios, which divide EBITDA less capex by interest and scheduled repayments, exist for that reason. Under IFRS 16 they also check whether covenants were set on a frozen accounting basis (the rules at signing) or on current rules, since the change in EBITDA from lease capitalization alters leverage ratios without any change in risk.
- Total debt
- All debt ranking ahead of equity, at face value.
- EBITDA
- Usually LTM adjusted EBITDA as defined in the credit agreement.
- EV
- Enterprise value, typically the purchase price in a buyout.